The relationship between France and the United States is mainly played out at the bilateral level on defense matters, but in European-American forums when it comes to an EU competence such as trade. France’s presidency of the Council of the European Union could give Paris more influence in the first half of 2022, even though the Biden administration seems to be giving greater weight to its relationship with Berlin.
Defense: Post-AUKUS, What Progress Can Be Expected?
Regarding defense interests, there are three issues that will be fundamental to Franco-American relations in 2022. First, the Sahel, where French forces have been at the forefront of combating jihadism for nearly ten years. The announced end to Operation Barkhane will lead to the French presence being reduced and reconfigured. Paris is counting on its European allies to provide special forces as part of the Takuba Task Force, and on the United States to carry on providing support in intelligence and logistics.
Second, in the Indo-Pacific, the submarine rift is too recent to permit talks about the possibility of France joining the AUKUS treaty. However, Franco-American reconciliation began at the Rome G20 summit in October 2021, and American officials say they now have a better understanding of the importance of the French military presence in the region.
Third, there is the topic of “European strategic autonomy,” on which France is taking a lead. The United States wants Europe to get more involved in defense, but it has always preferred that this should occur within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and based on the purchase of American weaponry. The Biden administration has, nevertheless, made some concessions in the aftermath of the AUKUS affair. The United States-France joint statement made in Rome declares that “the United States recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense that [...] is complementary to NATO.”
But Washington is not the only obstacle. European nations bordering Russia fear that the American protection delivered via NATO would be weakened by an autonomous European defense. It does not seem very likely that the United States will provide any reassurance to Poland or the Baltic states on this matter! In Germany, on the other hand, the new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, could turn out to be closer to Paris than his predecessor, Angela Merkel, was. His coalition agreement mentions “strategic sovereignty” for Europe, a term that will need to be defined.
The Receding Specter of Trade War
The difficulties that had been undermining transatlantic trade relations now seem to have been lifted: the Airbus-Boeing dispute was resolved by the World Trade Organization; the French GAFA tax was suspended after the major tax reform led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G20; and Trump-era steel and aluminum tariffs were removed by an agreement reached on October 31, 2021.
Although free trade seems to be out of fashion at the moment, it is nevertheless possible to contemplate progress in transatlantic trade, thanks to the Trade and Technology Council, created in June 2021. This new United States-European Union forum is intended for developing common strategies and standards in relation to Chinese technological ambitions, and also for regulating the many digital challenges posed by the Big Five tech companies (data protection, competition, taxation, etc.).
More puzzling, however, is the creation of a transatlantic collaboration platform on agriculture in early November 2021. The platform aims to encourage dialogue on the trade in food products between the United States and Europe. Yet the United States is determined to export products that do not meet European quality standards. The French presidency of the Council of the European Union will need to remain vigilant on this issue.
Finally, the Biden administration seems determined to pursue a policy of economic sanctions, against Russia in particular. On the European side, the INSTEX mechanism for non-US dollar transactions, launched by France, did not work. It will therefore be necessary to rely on diplomacy to try to protect the interests of French and European businesses from this powerful weapon, which American administrations—even Democratic ones—have no intention of relinquishing.