India is one of France’s oldest strategic partners in Asia. France has been building up a special relationship with India for more than twenty years, targeting sectors of strategic importance, in particular defense, security, space, civil nuclear power, and (more recently) environmental protection and the fight against climate change. It is a relationship characterized by mutual trust, with relatively few friction points. Moreover, India, which is keen to preserve its own independence of action on the international scene, sees the strategic autonomy promoted by France as an asset.
The relationship has benefited from being rather “discreet,” conducted far from media spotlights. India is widely courted, however, especially now that China is giving such cause for concern. France's first challenge is therefore to maintain and strengthen its special relationship with India, which implies deploying a unique, top-quality supply capacity, with terms that India will find attractive.
Maintaining and Deepening the Special Nature of the Strategic Relationship between France and India
The institutional framework underpinning the dialogue between France and India is solid. France is even described by India as one of its closest partners, yet Paris has been unable to set up a 2+2 dialogue with New Delhi, when Japan, the United States, Australia, and Russia have all succeeded in doing so. Launching a dialogue of this type must therefore remain a goal for France in the coming months.
Paris has committed itself to support India’s strategic autonomy in industry and technology, and it has promised to contribute to Prime Minister Modi’s major initiative, “Make in India.” This commitment will be at the heart of future French proposals in the defense industry, which is a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As a case in point, France’s two biggest contracts (to manufacture six Scorpene submarines, with technology transfer, won in 2005, and the “off-the-shelf” sale of thirty-six Rafale fighters, won in 2016) will soon come to an end. It would be beneficial to the bilateral relationship if France managed to get a new flagship deal signed (for the sale of additional Rafale fighters, for example), even though defense industry cooperation ought not to be the sole determinant of Franco-Indian exchanges.
Over the years, France and India have developed a shared approach to ensuring security in the Indian Ocean. This convergence of approach was formalized in the 2018 Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. It has also led to multiple instances of cooperation, not just naval, but also in logistic support, exchanges of maritime information, satellite surveillance, “blue economy” issues, and diplomatic support to join a range of regional forums. What is more, thanks to its military presence in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti, as well as its overseas departments of Réunion and Mayotte, France offers India unique cooperation opportunities in the western Indian Ocean. This offer of cooperation in the western Indian Ocean is of interest to India and is an asset that France should cultivate. But while France encourages its Indian partners to contribute even more to security initiatives in the region, it will have to bear in mind that India has a wide range of eager potential partners available. A move toward “minilateral”-format exercises could be worth considering as a solution.
Paris is committed to supporting New Delhi in its energy transition and in its efforts to combat climate change. Numerous projects have been launched in urban transport, the protection of biodiversity, and clean energy. Solar energy is already a significant area of cooperation, with the launch of programs by the International Solar Alliance and private-sector partnerships. In civil nuclear power, on the other hand, EDF’s bid to build six EPRs at Jaitapur has not yet gotten off the ground. Getting this huge project started will remain a key objective for Paris.
Encouraging Partnership with the European Union and in the Indo-Pacific
From the start, France has emphasized India’s importance in its strategy for the Indo-Pacific, and this importance is even greater post-AUKUS. While it pursues a third way in the Indo-Pacific, Paris will have to avoid putting India in a situation where it has to choose between France and Australia, or, even worse, between France and the United States. Thinking pragmatically, France will have to remember that, from New Delhi’s perspective, AUKUS opens the door to technology transfer in the field of nuclear-propelled submarines.
France and India generally have a similar vision of the Indo-Pacific, in that they both see multilateralism and an inclusive approach as the highest priority, while campaigning against the formation of alliance blocks and for a rules-based international order. It is very much in Paris’s interest to encourage New Delhi’s initiatives for the Indo-Pacific, particularly when they concern non-traditional security issues. France, which has already joined the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, both proposed by Prime Minister Modi in 2019, will have to make sure it has an active role in these projects.
It will also have to arrange for India to become a major partner in the European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The time is ripe because, after decades of failing to understand the EU, India has shown a genuine interest in it in recent years. During its presidency of the Council in 2022, France will push forward the major issues for cooperation between India and the EU, which include maritime security in the Indian Ocean, digital trade, connectivity, emerging technologies, and 5G. One important goal will be to encourage India to adopt standards similar to Europe’s on digital trade and emerging technologies.
Keeping a Watchful Eye on India’s Democratic Backsliding
The importance and robustness of relations with India must not make France forget that the former has taken a step backward in its democracy as a result of Prime Minister Modi’s authoritarianism and the xenophobia of the movement to which he belongs. It will be essential to comment discreetly (off-mike) but regularly on France’s concerns about India’s democratic backsliding. Similarly, France expressing interest in hearing and supporting alternative and dissident Indian voices, whether from nongovernmental organizations or intellectual communities, will be a crucial signal to the Indian authorities.