On February 17, 2022, after long months of rising tensions and acute political crisis, President Emmanuel Macron was announcing the swift withdrawal of the French troops stationed in Mali under the flag of operation Barkhane. Although this announcement was the direct consequence of Bamako’s decision to severe diplomatic ties with Paris two weeks before that date, it needs to be put in perspective with previous statements, especially that of June 10, 2021, in which the French head of state was already laying grounds for the termination of Barkhane – not only in Mali but throughout the Sahel area – by the end of 2022. This counterterrorist operation involving more than 5,000 soldiers was launched in 2014. It covers a vast theater spanning five nations (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) and more than 5 million square kilometers. Intended to follow up the French intervention that pushed jihadists out of northern Mali in early 2013, Operation Barkhane had a clear mandate: to continue tracking down the terrorists who were scattered across the Sahelo-Saharan strip and to train the armed forces of partner countries. These objectives were meant to buy some time for a political process to take place to try to resolve the fundamental governance problems that had led to the jihadists’ success.
The Political Process at a Standstill
Political momentum in 2014 was strong, with a new Malian government in place following free elections, and an Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation signed with the armed groups from northern Mali the following year. But it very quickly ran into the sand. The implementation of the Agreement (currently completely stalled) first ran into difficulties because of the vagueness of the terms and a lack of will from the parties, particularly those from the north, who preferred the situation of de facto autonomy to being responsible for change. As for the central government in Bamako, it has done no more than renew old practices of clientelism and corruption. Unsurprisingly, the coups d’état of August 2020 and May 2021 have not led to any significant improvement in governance. They have focused Malian political life on palace intrigues and delayed the necessary reworking of the social fabric.
Une menace qui s’étend
The jihadist insurgency has been able to take advantage of this political standstill. It is structured around two rival organizations, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, attached to ISIS. Despite this division and continuing attrition due to counterterrorist activities—French, in particular—these two groups have demonstrated their resilience and an increasingly solid local entrenchment. Through capillary territorial growth, they have managed to extend their zone of influence toward the south (the center of Mali, the southwest of Niger, the north and east of Burkina Faso), with offshoots now reaching the northern parts of Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Benin. They thrive on local populations’ grievances against state governance experienced as illegitimate, brutal, inefficient, and corrupt.
The Failure of “Sahelization”
Ever since the start of Operation Barkhane, it has been clear that France could not support such an onerous counterterrorist operation indefinitely. Different “strategies” have therefore been thought up to allow France, if not to leave the Sahel entirely, at least to reduce its involvement. The initial strategy aimed to strengthen partner countries’ capabilities and to regionalize the fight against terrorism, through a “joint force” composed of half a dozen battalions drawn from the armed forces of the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso). However, there is no denying the slowness of its implementation, the persistence of coordination problems and even of mistrust between the militaries, and above all, the structural weakness of the troops, due not so much to a lack of valor as to deficient governance of the armed forces (in terms of logistics, funding, and human resources). Finally, the diplomatic tensions caused by the double coup d’état in Mali, the spread of the terrorist crises in Niger and Burkina Faso, and Chad’s internal problems have tended to dampen the hopes of cross-border cooperation.
The Limits of Europeanization
Faced with the failure of “Sahelization,” France has opted for a strategy of Europeanization. Takuba Task Force, initiated by France, consists of a detachment of special forces from a dozen European nations. It reached full operational capability in spring 2021 and is expected eventually to reach 2,000 men to provide most of the operational military partnership and the combat support currently carried out by Barkhane. Although this Europeanization shows off France’s leadership abilities and allows the political and military cost of counterterrorism in the Sahel to be attenuated at an opportune moment, it also means there is a risk of losing consistency—internally and in the interface with partners—and long-term monitoring, as Sahelian security issues are not yet entirely understood by France’s European allies.
The Great Political Divergence
It is well understood that the conflict in the Sahel is essentially a result of local governance problems. France cannot provide indefinite support to a system that it knows contributes to both the conditions that lead to terrorism and the weakness of the security forces. This analysis has accelerated a political divergence between Paris and Sahelian governments, Bamako in particular. There have been increasing disagreements with the Malian authorities, especially since the 2020 coup d’état, on topics as fundamental as opening negotiations with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims. The suspension of joint military operations between France and Mali for more than a month in spring 2021 and the deterioration in relations following provocative statements by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga precipitated Emmanuel Macron’s decision to bring Operation Barkhane to an end. Bamako’s call for Russian help, and the intervention of private security operators from Wagner Group from December 2021 onwards, only sped up the breakup with France and the France-led European coalition. Divorce became definitive by mid-February, leading to an early withdrawal of Barkhane and Takuba units.
Toward Regionalization
Despite this political imbroglio, France cannot abandon the Sahel completely, due to the impact this would have on the security of the countries on the Gulf of Guinea, where France has even greater interests. What is more, plots to undermine French positions by hostile actors like Russia or Turkey demonstrate that the challenges are far greater than the struggle against terrorism.
The closing of French bases in Mali now entails a reshuffling of assets towards Niger, where political convergence should make it possible to envision a persisting deployment, while keeping a lower profile than before and mostly centered on force assistance and air power “reassurance”. But beyond this immediate perspective, French regional military posture in the Sahel and wider West Africa – including its permanently deployed overseas forces in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire – should be able to evolve. Such a long-term approach, less ambitious and more low-key, should make it possible to preserve the most essential interests while rebuilding a dangerously damaged political capital.